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ABSTRACT 
The essay proposes to re-orient feminist debates on epistemology towards the 
care-security nexus as a pathway that can plausibly provide an integral 
understanding of a human-centred and eco-minded security. Seeing ‘gender’ in 
binary terms tends to produce an understanding of ‘care’ as ‘female’ and 
‘security’ as ‘male’. Care, when free from the constraints of gender as a binary 
construct, can play an important role in revealing the depth of ethical-political 
concerns and help expand the understanding of security. By revisiting the 
concept of care present in the two feminist innovations – situated knowledge 
and knowledge production as quilting – the essay shows that there are gains to 
be made in bridging existing rifts between feminist knowledge networks and 
beyond. The concept of situated knowledge gives significance to care as self-
reflexivity – an ongoing process and a multifaceted nature of experience in the 
relation between the knower and the known. Knowledge production as 
quilting displaces the image of the solitary knowledge agent and provides a 
flexible approach to epistemology less constrained by teleological assumptions, 
appealing instead to interdisciplinary and inter-cultural cooperation. Both 
aspects of feminist epistemology are conducive to address the care-security 
nexus as an open and dynamic phenomenon, for which a successful inclusion 
of distinctive insights from different disciplines and cultural frameworks of 
knowledge would be a gain.  
Keywords 
Feminist epistemology, care, human security, development 
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FEMINIST KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN 
SECURITY 
BRIDGING RIFTS THROUGH THE EPISTEMOLOGY 
OF CARE1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This essay views feminism as a broad social movement made up of coalitions 
for egalitarian systemic changes. The relations between feminism and 
knowledge forms are historical, as are the types of coalitions fostered. 
Understanding feminist politics and its epistemology in these terms is helpful 
to reflect on the current challenges facing knowledge networks engaging with 
issues of security. Beyond war and peace, feminist politics today address many 
transnational issues such as trade and financial liberalisation, the impacts of 
their fluctuations across the world, the links between economic crises and 
environmental deterioration and their practical meanings for people’s security 
in daily lives. Such politics require a mode of cooperation that can help bring 
to the surface the multiple ways in which knowledge is politically constituted 
and how it is translated into materially insecure modes of existence for specific 
groups of people. A human-centred approach to security opens up an 
opportunity to explore these issues and critically reflect on societal responses 
as well as the body of knowledge that informs them. Gains can be made 
through mutual learning and interdisciplinary and inter-cultural cooperation to 
address the interconnected aspects of human security and their ethical 
implications on different scales. 
A major area of contention has been the interpretation of gender 
problems and the directions of feminist collective actions. The persisting 
dilemma between engaging with knowledge and policy-making bodies to 
rewrite gender from within, and/or maintaining autonomous critical voices 
external to the institutions of power, has placed limits on coalition building. 
Internal diversity and external pressure become intensified when feminist 
politics take on transnational and trans-local dimensions, especially when 
factors such as the geopolitical positioning of actors, resources and generation 
gaps within the women’s movements are taken into consideration. Dominant 
knowledge systems have displayed a persistent insensitivity to how the 
contextual intersection between different structures of power can produce 
significantly varied experiences of exclusion and political subjectivity. A 
singular understanding of gender is incapable of capturing capture the multi-
dimensional nature of social exclusion. At the same time, an intersectional 
definition of gender – as a subject position emerged from the articulation of 
interlinked power structures – falls short of helping to foster political and 
                                                 
1 My appreciation is extended to John Cameron for his extensive, sensitive and critical 
comments. Shortcomings are entirely mine. 
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cognitive alliances due to an overemphasis on the content of the subjective 
experience (Hancock, 2006). Differing approaches to gender knowledge, 
modes of engagement with the ‘margins’ and practices of participation can also 
fail to realize the commitment to inclusiveness (Ackerly, 2007).  
This essay proposes to re-orient feminist debates towards the care-security 
nexus as a pathway that can plausibly provide an integral understanding of a 
human-centred and eco-minded notion of security. Seeing ‘gender’ in binary 
terms tends to produce the understanding of ‘care’ as ‘female’ and ‘security’ as 
‘male’. Yet critical feminist inquiries into ‘development’ and ‘security’ in daily 
lives show how the two domains are closely related – rather than two separate 
compartments as they have been styled for administrative purposes. Tronto’s 
(1993) conceptual map helps to reveal how practices of caring are implicit in 
both domains. She identifies four ethical elements of care: attentiveness, 
responsibility, competence, and responsiveness; and delineates four modes of 
caring – caring about, taking care of, care-giving, and care-receiving. The 
‘public’ side of ‘caring about’ is to be found in the construct of the political 
subject (deliberation and rationality). Likewise taking care of something is a 
‘public’ activity resulting from the translation of deliberation into 
organizational agency. By contrast, care-giving and care-receiving acts are 
culturally constructed such that they are recognized primarily in private and 
emotional aspects of interpersonal relationships. Reworking this conceptual 
map to show the dialectical interaction between public and private modes of 
caring is important to extend feminist epistemology to human security, 
considered to be an open and dynamic phenomenon. Understanding how 
particular experiences are bounded by geo-political power structures may help 
to trace the differentiated meanings of human security and the hidden 
subjectivities that produce knowledge frameworks guiding action.  
By viewing feminist epistemology as a canvas where the themes of care 
and security have been articulated in different ways – in response to particular 
needs and audiences — we might find an underlying unity in streams of 
thought that is valuable to foster alliances capable of integrating different 
aspects of security. Revisiting two distinctive features of feminist knowledge – 
‘situated knowledge’ and knowledge-making as ‘quilting’ – may serve to reflect 
on emerging responses to today’s realities: transnational politics with multi- 
and trans-local dimensions, and security-searching activities on a planetary 
scale. The former requires corresponding means of appreciation and 
communication of knowledge as flows of ideas between different locations and 
situations; and the latter requires a refashioning of ‘identity’ as unity – the homo 
sapiens whose survival depends on other life-forms and eco-systems –  while 
recognizing the contextual power of identities and subjectivities as immanent 
in distributive justice and action for peaceful transformations. 
2 THE WRITING ON CARE IN FEMINIST 
EPISTEMOLOGY  
Feminist epistemology and knowledge networks are the outcomes of long-
standing women’s engagements with social movements inspired by diverse 
causes: anti-slavery, peace, national liberation, labour rights, sexual rights, faith-
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based and environmental concerns. Recognizing the historical contingencies 
and the seemingly dispersed lines of thoughts is helpful to appreciate feminist 
epistemology and politics as ensembles of practices with distinctive rationales 
formed at various levels of social and political life. Approaching diversity in 
these terms would treat feminist thought not only as currently existing, but as 
something contingent on what Foucault refers to as a ‘history of veridictions’ 
(Foucault, 1984: 943). In other words, the entry point to the diversity of 
feminist thought would be to examine how a particular feminist discourse 
strive to validate itself in regard of specific audiences, and how a specific 
perspective comes to be considered as valuable and valid (or unconvincing) in 
a particular domain. Rather than isolated instances of ‘doing gender’ or ‘acting 
feminist’ in an idealized sense, feminist knowledge building is considered here 
as arising from care as a deeper stream of knowledge of the sense, manifest in 
diverse cultural forms of thinking and social action. 
Derived from women’s act of positing themselves as a subject of 
knowledge in relation to gender constructs, along with other relations that 
made up their quotidian universe, feminist thought begun with the reflections 
on caring as the repetitive activities to sustain life. It questions why these are 
treated as secondary to other concerns in scientific theories and social reforms 
programmes and how this treatment coincides with the subordination of 
women, children and other life forms under specific political rules. Though 
feminist knowledge has a long history, its formal appellation as ‘feminist 
epistemology’ was known since women’s massive entry into the academia in 
the Western world. These scholars took a critical stance towards the 
Enlightenment and affiliated scientific paradigms – considered to be tainted by 
three main heuristic biases: male, European and ‘productive age’ (Fox Keller 
and Longino, 1996). The goal of feminist epistemology is to identify the types 
of epistemic injustice2 found in the world of science and to follow through 
their multiple consequences in social reforms programmes. The insertion of 
feminist values in the acquisition of knowledge, the questioning of its 
justification of validity and credibility in representation has revealed how 
particular ontological premises have buttressed the writings of gender, race and 
age and supported the translation of these thoughts into organizational agency. 
Proposed alternative frameworks for knowledge and practice on more 
egalitarian and inclusive terms have yet to address diversity both at the 
experiential level and in ontological frames.  
Sandra Harding’s seminal work (1986) discerned four main feminist 
epistemological approaches: empiricism, standpoint, post-modernism and 
post-colonialism. Harding’s classification of different positions is useful to 
identify the lines of interactions, issues of contestation and possible innovation. 
Her narrow approach to empiricism initially identified it uniquely with 
positivism has shown to be problematic. She classified feminist empiricists as 
                                                 
2 The term ‘epistemic injustice’ was coined by Craig (1990) to refer to non-egalitarian 
norms of credibility that tend to lean more in favour of the powerful than they 
deserve while denying credibility to the powerless. This can occur both in testimony 
and heuristically. 
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those practicing natural and social sciences relying on logical positivist theories, 
which mystify social facts by first abstracting them and then treating them as 
reality. Harding maintains her scepticism about the possibility of correcting 
positivist science through a critique, in view of vested interests in the social 
structure of science and given the absence of a countervailing power by 
marginalised groups (Duran, 1998). The conflation between positivism and 
empiricism has led to sceptic, if not hostile, tendencies among post-modernist 
feminist knowledge agents towards empiricism as a paradigm. Markie (2008) 
notes that the original meaning of empiricism accords significance to the 
experience of the sense in shaping our concepts and knowledge. This aspect of 
empiricism is generally obliterated in some writings of post-modernist 
feminists even though the knowledge of the sense is a central feminist concern. 
Since Harding’s intervention debates on feminist social knowledge has 
produced a spectrum of epistemological positions. On the one end some 
scholars hold the view that there is merit in retaining the modernist 
foundational requirements of ‘good knowing’ in science, emphasising the 
significance of evidence, shared standards of justification and procedures in 
knowledge-making as a cumulative process. On the other end, some post-
modernist scholars discard the idea of knowledge as a cumulative process, 
together with universal standards. They emphasise instead its context-
dependency and culturally shaped modes of knowing, for which the standard 
of ‘good knowing’ may be understood as the ability to account for diverse 
subjectivities and voices.  
Feminist-standpoint theory gravitates between the two ends of the 
spectrum and affiliated standards of ‘good knowing’ using the constants of the 
female lenses. Borrowing from Marxian debates on consciousness and class 
position, this body of thought tried to bring issues of gender identity, 
consciousness and cognitive style to bear on theorising in social knowledge and 
transformational practices. It establishes a close connection between an 
epistemic perspective and a social location of women. For example, women’s 
practical experiences as central actors in systems of reproduction (Hartsock, 
1987), as social objects on to which male desires are projected and acted upon 
(McKinnon 1987), or as possessing different cognitive styles (Gilligan, 1982),3 
are considered as significant realities based on which an alternative 
epistemological and moral perspective can be developed. In this view, the 
nexus of women’s gender identity and social position is believed to be capable 
of sharpening their knowledge about gainers and sufferers from a social system 
built on the principle of male superiority. Men are considered uninterested to 
access this knowledge due to their privileged positions. In claiming to represent 
the world from the perspective of women’s subordination, this stream of 
                                                 
3 Starting from the observation that women are more oriented towards concern and 
commitments that arise from relationships, Gilligan argued that women’s identity is 
built on a relational self. Their moral judgments necessarily include feelings of 
compassion and empathy for others. ‘Care reasoning’ is a female feature – distinct 
from ‘justice reasoning’ as male. In care reasoning, women’s own and other’s 
responsibilities are grounded in social context and interpersonal commitments.  
 9
standpoint theory seeks to justify its epistemic authority about the condition of 
being female that can inform research and political programmes.  
Socially and politically contested issues such as prostitution, pornography, 
sexual labour, sex-work, the value of domestic labour, women’s choices and 
agency formed by different interests and subjectivities have placed limits on 
these claims. These issues urge scholars to scrutinize the character of social 
inequality that defines the sub-groups among women, the specific features of 
their marginalisation, their affinity and consciousness. Parallel to this, multiple 
transformations under the pressures of globalization and the diverse affect of 
connectivity on organisational strategies have exposed the limits of a 
hegemonic definition of gender – a single unit of analysis above other social 
categories – and pushed for the refinement of feminist-standpoint theory 
(Collins, 1990; Martín-Alcoff, 2007). Study of interactions between social 
categories – gender, race, age, class, sexuality – and the resultant experiences of 
inequality and political subjectivity, is now a core area of reflection and debate. 
A critical question, that various feminist knowledge communities contend with, 
is how to find ways to possibly draw from a diversity of epistemological 
resources in order to (a) make the intersection between different forms of 
social vulnerability more visible to the public eye; and (b) create an 
environment with necessary mechanisms to facilitate fair debates on the 
meanings of gender equality and justice in order to guide organisation 
strategies for change.  
In revising standpoint theory Harding (1993) retains the view that 
partiality is the inevitable effect of the location of the inquirer, and emphasizes 
the need to place oneself on the same critical, causal plane with the objects of 
knowledge. She proposes the concept strong objectivity, taking into account 
the roles of ‘good’ as well as ‘bad’ values in the production of knowledge. 
Considering that the knowledge agent is always placed in an environment 
where cultural beliefs function at every stage of scientific inquiry4 strong 
objectivity requires that scientists and their communities adopt practices of 
self-reflexivity to mediate the perspective of the oppressed groups and 
integrate the good values – such as democracy-advancing ones – to their 
projects. Thus, according to this perspective, an assessment of ‘better’ 
knowledge does not depend on eliminating subjectivity (beliefs and values) and 
conforming to some false ideal of objectivism. It depends on examining 
whether and how self-reflexivity and the incorporation of democratic values in 
scientific inquiry can generate new viewpoints that improve the understanding 
about gender relations in a given domain (Narayan and Harding, 2000; 
Crasnow, 2006).  
As Michaelian (2008:75-76) points out among the good biases of particular 
interest to Harding is the political commitment of science to serve the interests 
                                                 
4 The selection of problems, the formation of hypotheses, the design of research 
(including the organization of research communities), the collection of data, the 
interpretation and sorting of data, decisions about when to stop research, the way 
results of research are reported, and so on (Harding, 2004, 136).  
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of the marginalized rather than the dominant groups. However, the concept of 
‘marginality’ is hardly clarified. Accepting ‘good’ bias in this way means that the 
political can be considered internal to the epistemic without having to specify 
the beneficiaries on the margins. Furthermore this position is surprisingly close 
of the modernist antecedent of rationality, yet it is not supported by a meta-
narrative to assess the validity of claims to strong objectivity (Michaelian, 2008: 
78). Rolin (2006) points out that the bias paradox in Harding’s epistemology is 
built on two main claims: epistemic privilege and situated knowledge. The 
assumption that a standard of impartiality (strong objectivity) enables one to 
judge some perspectives as better than others contradicts the situated 
knowledge claim — which purports that all knowledge is partial. A resolution 
to this paradox, Rolin suggests, is the adoption of a contextualist theory of 
epistemic justification that explains how claims to an epistemic privilege may 
be warranted when a broader shift in context calls into question the credibility 
of assumptions formerly accepted as an entitlement.  
Rolin’s suggestion may help in resolving the difficulties posed by the 
concept of intersectionality that shows how marginalized groups occupy a 
social terrain in which the interactions between multiple axes of power can 
produce unique experiences of oppression and subjectivities, structurally 
invisible to policy and law-making as well as to the politics of social 
movements (Crenshaw 1994, 2000). Applying the concept of an epistemic 
privilege in such cases remains problematic. As Hancock (2006: 250) observes, 
the restriction of understanding of intersectionality as an issue of ‘content of 
the social experience’ has led to what has been termed as an ‘Oppression 
Olympics’ where groups compete, rather than cooperate, in a struggle to obtain 
access to the fringes of opportunities and resources. How intersectionality 
works and what it does to the experience of inhabiting a ‘marginal universe’ 
depends on the specific location of the subject concerned. The challenge posed 
by intersectionality to feminist standpoint theory is greater than what Harding’s 
concepts of ‘strong objectivity’ and ‘epistemic democracy’ have to offer. 
Marginality as a mode of existence can take many different forms, with 
distinctively different implications regarding the articulation of power and 
distributive justice5. When these are taken into account, the weakness of 
‘strong objectivity’ is revealed, as it provides little insight on how to rank 
epistemic privileges. 
                                                 
5 Two examples of marginality involving multiple identities may serve to illustrate this 
point. A woman of colour who has been trafficked across border for sex work, who is 
‘rescued’ and detained while waiting for judicial decision on asylum or repatriation can 
be identified by her marginal identities of gender, ethnicity, illegal worker, irregular 
migrant, and person in detention. In this ‘in-between’ mode of existence who is to 
decide which marginality identity should prevail based on which justification?  
Another example involves the circulation between multiple locations of marginality as 
experienced by many African nationals who undertake trans-Saharan or maritime 
migratory routes. They are in a semi-permanent transit status on their way to, and 
even when they reach, Europe. Each of these modes of marginality entails particular 
consequences for political economy, judicial systems and moral reasoning about 
inequality. 
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Haraway’s (2004) concept of ‘situated knowledge’ – often used 
interchangeably with Harding’s strong objectivity – begins with the 
acknowledgement of diversity and hybridity. She takes this as a starting point 
to guide the knowledge agent to find unlikely coalitions between systematically 
oppressed groups. In other words, she resists a-priori assumptions on 
oppression and affinity. Like Harding her post-structuralist analysis of science 
endorses the rejection of neutrality and context-free knowledge-making, while 
holding on to the quest for constant clarification by the knowledge agent about 
his/her positioning and evolving sense of affinity. Positioning always means 
partiality; and partiality can be justified by the active learning from a thoughtful 
and caring engagement with others. She explains: ‘A part of my consciousness 
is microcosmic: every microcosm explodes into a universe as a function of 
what you are asking, not because it is out there waiting to show the interesting 
intersections or borderlands or whatever. It is your own relationship with what 
it is that you care about that opens up the borderlands that are interesting 
(Haraway in Schneider, 2005: 116, 120). Any act of caring is considered to have 
the potential to make the knowledge agent more worldly, through the 
multiplication of connections which her/his engagement develops. Careful 
attentiveness to others, including other systems and life forms would benefit 
scientific inquiry. ‘As you care you change and you are changed, so that your 
questions change and your partners are different’ (Ibid: 120). Positioning thus 
implies a process of constant ethical revision of one’s relations towards others.  
Positioning works together with ‘diffraction’ – defined as a method to 
record different patterns of knowing and seeing arising from the interactions 
with others, to track their impact on the course of the research process and 
note the subsequent understandings (Haraway, 2004). Whereas positioning 
serves to locate the knowledge agent relationally, diffraction serves to envisage 
the process of recording the knowledge developed. In her view interaction, 
interruption, difference, and possible discovery of novelty about affinity – 
rather than identity – produce the conditions for building coalitions. 
Positioning and diffraction makes Haraway’s version of social 
constructivism distinct from Harding’s strong objectivity. It is characterised by 
a fuller notion of being ‘relational’ shown in her choice of position to be 
directed by the sense of care (caring about and caring to know) which she 
thinks is more likely to lead to the sense of affinity (as something to be gained 
rather than assumed). She also does not endorse a reduced understanding of 
empiricism as positivism and take distance from a teleological view regarding a 
pre-given value (such as epistemic democracy) as the determinant of 
transformative knowledge and change. In combining ethical, scientific and 
political concerns her proposal to interpret objectivity in terms of ‘situated 
knowledge’ gives consideration to the agency of both the subject and the 
objects of knowledge. Agency is mutually implicated in an ongoing creation of 
new hybrids of knowledge, or outcomes of the fusion of substantively different 
knowledge forms but capable of delivering more insightful explanations.  
In the defence of empiricism Nelson (1990; 1993) proposed a neo-
empiricism that can avoid the implications of positivism. She draws on Quine’s 
(1951) ‘naturalistic’ empiricism built on the view that theories are bridges of 
the scientist’s own construction, constrained by their experience. All activities 
in knowledge-making and organizing science constitute a web of beliefs in 
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which the distinction between ‘knowledge as discovered’ and ‘knowledge as a 
social construct’ is artificial. Endorsing the view of science as part of, rather 
detached from, society Nelson extends Quine’s view on beliefs held by the 
scientists to those embedded in the institutional arrangements in scientific 
inquiry itself. Institutional arrangements of science, not just scientists, are 
under the influence of political, economic and epistemological factors, which 
in turn affect the theories produced. Feminist knowledge – regarded as an 
emergent web of knowledge in which networks of scientists function within 
male dominated institutional rules of power – occupies a lower position in the 
hierarchy of cognitive labour and authority. She coins this phenomenon as 
‘androcentrism’, rather than sexism or male bias, seeking to avoid biological 
reductionism and taking into account research findings that show how ‘men’ 
and ‘women’ are neither exclusively biological nor social, but enormously 
plastic and complex (Nelson, 1993: 190). The sciences – particularly natural 
sciences – are no longer concerned with ultimate truths but with data that is 
corrigible and revisable to fit agreeably into the web of beliefs. Empiricism, she 
argues, must be understood as a theory of evidence – distinct from empiricist 
accounts of science6. In this respect, androcentrism (in methodology, 
categories, organizing principles) can be corrected since in the advancement of 
science male scientists cannot afford to remain blind to what feminist scientists 
have made visible. Acknowledging this, she advocates that feminist scientists 
should incorporate political views, including those shaped by, and those that 
are shaping the experiences of gender. They should contribute to theories 
based on evidence through critical assessment among communities of 
knowledge agents.  
Longino (2002) suggests four governing norms for interaction in a 
knowledge community: (a) publicly recognized forums for criticism; (b) an 
uptake of criticism; (c) publicly recognized standards; (d) interaction in mutual 
respect (allowing for differences in intellectual capacity and equality of 
authority of judgement). Prevailing scientific orthodoxies remain particularly 
challenging for the implementation of the principle of equal authority of 
judgement7. Moreover, Ackerly (2007) warns that deliberations within 
                                                 
6 As Quine pointed out modern empiricism has been conditioned by two dogmas. 
One is a belief in a fundamental cleavage between analytic truths – grounded in 
meanings independently of matters of fact, and synthetic truths – grounded in fact. 
The other is reductionism or the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to 
some logical construct – upon terms which refer to immediate experience. In the 
social sciences, empiricist accounts are characterised by the tendency towards 
operationalism, the desire to objectify and quantify, the emphasis on correspondence 
rules, deductive certainty, empirical tightness, and so forth. 
7 Cato (2009) explains: ‘You cannot teach economics without maths, apparently, 
although you can teach it without morality. And the converse also applies. Because if 
you are part of a discipline that cannot function without counting then it cannot 
properly value what cannot be measured. Moral considerations are, for this reason, 
excluded wholesale from economics as taught in our universities’. 
http://www.theecologist.org/blogs_and_comments/commentators/Molly_Scott_Cat
o/ (accessed September 4, 2009). 
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transnational feminism is far from these aspired norms since the language of 
feminism and gender is not shared, and unequal access to feminist space 
remains a constraint. Politically driven consensus can also stifle marginal 
voices. Ackerly’s warning resonates the post-colonial perspective, which treats 
the acts of seeking knowledge about, and ethical engagements of its actors 
with, ‘Third World’ subjects critically at best and with suspect at worst. 
Spivak (2005), for example, calls for vigilance and attention to self-
implication and cautions about the dialectics of ‘self’ and ‘other’ that refer only 
to upper-class multiculturalism. In a socially differentiated and hierarchical 
world, intellectuals do not function outside geopolitical institutions that 
circumscribe their epistemic agency. Pursing the goal of removing ‘epistemic 
injustice’ requires hyper self-reflexivity, critical narration and interpretation 
with accountability as regards the social realities scholars engage with (Kapoor, 
2004). Referring to a specific group for whom ‘epistemic injustice’ matters 
significantly, she calls attention to the specific meaning of the ‘Subaltern’ in 
Antonio Gramsci’s work, recorded by Ranajit Guha (Spivak, 2005). The term 
refers to ‘the space of difference inhabited by those who have no access to the 
lines of mobility within a society’, and emphasises a kind of class rather than 
identity – a class without political agency (but not necessarily without 
knowledge).  
Spivak (2005: 311) asserts that contemporary use of the term ‘subaltern’ in 
the light of diversity and Diasporas has lost its meaning due to its conflation 
with identity. Urging scholars to revisit assumptions about epistemic 
responsibility, she points out the futility of responding to the silencing of the 
subaltern woman by representing that woman, or by presenting her as a 
speaking subject. Lacking of any class description, it is not possible for the new 
class of intellectuals to see class (like gender) as a social category that organises 
understanding and therefore cannot fully portray the subaltern subject. The 
impulse to rewrite the human, the body and the social figure (in rethinking 
politics, agency and connection) appears to her as a strategy to undo particular 
narratives. In doing so there is a tendency to retrieve information about layers 
of identities and transmogrify them into ‘subject’ with agency – as 
institutionally validated action. For this reason she considers the act of 
deconstructing science in itself as insufficient in safeguarding a political 
programme. It can only safeguard against generalisations about the ‘subject’ 
within the same paradigm of emancipation. Rather than rewriting, she posits 
that unlearning one’s privilege (as one’s loss) might be a better strategy since it 
opens up the mind for new creative possibility: rearranging one’s own desire to 
learn from the act of learning about, and with, others must be a deliberate 
position (Morton, 2007: 172).  
Code’s (2008) approach to ecological thinking integrates feminist thoughts 
on situated knowledge, strong objectivity and post-colonialism to rework 
feminist naturalized empiricism through the language and practices of ecology. 
Ecological thinking acknowledges conflict and instability as realities and 
recognizes them at the same time as sources of strength. It offers a notion of 
‘inhabiting the world’ as active, thoughtful, affectively, socially and responsibly 
engaged practices that address the complexity and ambiguity of the real. It 
invites reflections on cohabitability and responsible knowledge as key principles of 
this mode of ‘inhabiting’. Codes’ proposed concept of epistemic location 
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deepens the meanings of situated knowledge and standpoint by requiring 
scholars to scrutinize and specify a wide set of things in a given location where 
inquiry is to be made. Beyond the requirement to scrutinize the standpoint of 
the knower and the nature of the known, she proposes to discern subjectivities 
and specificities in regard to place, habitat, habitus and ethics. These 
requirements are significant in view of her consideration of a terrain of inquiry 
to be constitutive of enactments of subjectivities, not just a context against 
which particular subjective interpretations are played out (Code, 2006: 199). It 
is always in practice empirically informed, specifically situated, and locally 
interpretive. The responsibility of knowledge agents is to question themselves 
as their own "objects" of knowledge: how they come to acquire a given 
understanding and how they learn about, and negotiate across and through, an 
epistemic terrain to address issues of diversity and particularity.  Code's notion 
of epistemic responsibility resonate Spivak’s post-colonial critique, which 
directs thinking towards analyses of ethical-politics as a dimension internal to 
the knowledge agents beyond and above those that have given shape to a given 
terrain of inquiry.  
As Wylie (2006: 7) observes, the expansion of the scope of ‘the social’ in 
feminist epistemology has shed light on the forms of epistemic diversity that 
track power and institutional conditions that have the capacity to systemically 
suppress dissenting voices. Addressing these social dimensions of knowledge 
would require the refinement of models of deliberation as well as the kinds of 
empirical research that illuminate the group dynamics, patterns of social 
inequality, and institutional conditions that generate epistemic diversity and the 
structure its reception.  
Reflecting on Thayer-Bacon’s (1999) use of the metaphor of quilting to 
define constructive thinking as a trans-active socio-political process – in which 
knowledge agents need to establish a common language to work together to 
produce something purposeful and of value – we may consider feminist 
debates on social epistemology as a process of quilt making, in which work 
might have been hampered by different ways of understanding ‘empiricism’, 
‘gender’ and ‘feminism’. Far from being distinctive blocks, feminist approaches 
to knowledge (empiricism, standpoint, post-modernism and post-colonialism) 
have transformed one another through their interaction, and in turn are 
transforming the fabric of feminist social epistemology. Attention to practices 
of co-learning in the making of responsible knowledge agents may help to 
achieve as a form of knowledge that can express the holistic character of 
knowing about ‘self’ and ‘other’ in a model that replaces the image of the 
solitary knowledge agent with a relational one. 
3 QUILTING GENDER INTO ‘SECURITY’ AND 
‘DEVELOPMENT’  
Gender matters have been implicit in security and development policy 
frameworks but have been written through the male eyes. A policy field and a 
domain of knowledge, ‘development’ emerged at the end of World War II 
within the agenda of international cooperation for peace as one of the two 
main set of issues: (a) control over the arms race (nuclear and other weapons 
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of mass destruction), (b) promotion of ‘modernisation’ – the economic and 
social development of post-colonial societies – conceived as instrumental in 
achieving peace. In a bifurcated world dominated by the Soviet Union and the 
United States, the meaning of ‘security’ was fragmented by administration: 
foreign policy was divorced from policy related to international political 
economy. This gave rise to two separate fields of study – security and 
development. Security studies are concerned with rationale for or against war, 
and development studies with the rationale of modernisation. Bipolar writing 
depicted the global order as ‘free’ versus ‘communist’ worlds – each one 
hustling for the reigning position – obliterating any significant alternative 
meanings. In the modernisation model the ‘modern’ is counterpoised with the 
‘traditional’. Tradition is treated as a residue of history expected gradually to 
vanish in the linear progression towards an ideal system of the ‘free world’. In 
the communist model ‘collective interests’ were counterpoised with ‘individual 
interests’ – the later being treated as a historical feature of capitalism expected 
to disappear in a linear progression towards a classless society. Both systems 
adopted a mechanical worldview in which the human subject is treated as a 
fairly fixed and stable element whose desires and identities can be moulded for 
the greater good of the respective social projects.  
Gender was written in the capitalist vision of equality as a distinction 
between ‘instrumental’ and ‘expressive’ qualities of being males and females. 
Gender difference justifies the social roles assigned to each gender as being 
natural (Parson and Bales, 1955). By contrast, gender was written in the 
communist vision of social equality as sameness8: something primary to the 
aspiration of a classless society. The efforts of the Commission on the Status 
of Women (CSW) set up after 1945, combined with several decades of 
agitation by feminists from different political strands, galvanised a new 
consciousness to change the above visions and the status they ascribed to 
gender.  
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) was adopted in 1979; continuous attempts to give 
substance to women’s rights have revealed the fallacy of ‘impartiality’ in 
structures of governance and assumptions about ‘tradition’ as being historical 
residues. The six decades of women’s engagement with the United Nations 
have to some extent transformed the practises of development agencies in all 
domains of gender justice: work, health, education and gender-based violence 
(Jain, 2005). But the discrepancy between the world of legal rights and the 
world of social positioning remains a challenge. Feminist scholars have shown 
how social identities (gender and ethnicity) and class position pre-structure the 
conditions of entry to a political community and the market, and how 
‘traditions’ – deeply embedded in cognitive structures – bestow institutions 
their power of consequences (Agosin, 2001).  
Various aspects of these problems were raised in critiques of ‘development 
as modernisation paradigm’ emerged in the 1970s. Arising from concerns 
                                                 
8 For example Mao Zedong’s famous slogan ‘women hold half of the sky’. 
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about the interplay of culture, gender and international political economy this 
critique sought to reveal the social positions of women as agents of change in 
the development process. In 1985, a collective – Development Alternatives 
with Women in a New Era (DAWN) – presented a manifesto which put 
forward a definition of ‘development’ as constituted by evolving systems 
characterized by intrinsic violence causing multi-layered crises in social 
reproduction (Sen and Crown, 1987)9. The manifesto posited the thesis that 
gender issues in ‘development’ are embedded in a broader context of 
cumulative violence growing out of priorities given to trade (both national and 
international) rather than to security in daily life. The consequent degrading 
impacts on both rural and urban environments were triggering new and 
complex poverty-generating processes. These in turn caused a deepening of 
social divisions and intensified oppression by way of transferring the burdens 
of production adjustments and costs on to specific groups: women of the 
working poor. Women’s protests and resistance had led to states exerting their 
disciplinary powers with increased militarization. The manifesto called for 
qualitative change in social relations and improved interaction between all the 
levels of society – household, community, market, state and inter-state. A 
wholesale reduction in military expenditure was demanded to divert resources 
into more socially oriented activities. An emphasis on women as agents-of-
change brought to the fore their capacity of seeing and acting on gender-based 
issues of justice in different arenas.  
Critique of the DAWN manifesto has been directed at its structuralist 
understanding of gender and its tendency to homogenize women’s interests 
which does not give sufficient attention to how gender identities are articulated 
through diverse discursive practices of inequalities (Marchand and Papart, 
1995). Women’s actual experience, consciousness and organisational strategies 
are often neither predictable, nor reducible to any single aspect gender 
oppression (Chhachhi and Pittin, 1996). A continuing thread in DAWN’s view 
is to be found in Enloe’s (1989) insights on the link between ‘development’ 
and ‘militarization.’ She places the social construction of masculinities and 
femininities within the connection between export-oriented growth strategies 
and security issues and demonstrates how the presence of military bases in 
developing countries coincided with direct foreign investment (in light 
industries, agribusiness and tourism). The masculine ideal of the warrior is to 
be found in a continuum of protector, conqueror and exploiter of the feminine 
and feminised ‘Other’. Enloe (2000) brings to light the phenomenon of 
militarization as a gradual process through which something becomes 
controlled by – depending on, or deriving its value from – the military and 
militaristic criteria. In masculine-dominated societies this subtle process 
encroaches on civil institutions and social space, hence clear-cut distinctions 
between the two domains of the civil and the military may well be a fallacy.  
                                                 
9 This manifesto emerged from consultations among women’s grass-root organisations 
in several regions in the ‘developing’ world (Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Latin 
America and the Caribbean).  
 17
Post-colonial scholars have demonstrated the link between masculinity 
and military force in the forging of a homogenised national entity. Wieringa 
(1996), for example, analysed how the inscriptions of social constructs of 
sexuality, gender, class and ethnicity in the nationalist discourses in Indonesia 
during the creation of the New Order led by Suharto (backed by the foreign 
policy of the United States) were consciously crafted into a strategy to destroy 
the socialist-inspired women’s organization. The triangulation of power – 
between gender construction plus the sexualisation of women’s identity at one 
angle, and state and nation at the other two angles – provided the legitimacy 
both for brutal acts against the corporal and personal dignity of members of 
this organisation, and the social marginalization of survivors. In the case of 
‘miracles of development’ within those countries aspiring to catch up with the 
West, the conflation of national identity, modernisation and industrial 
competitiveness was built on the cultural construct of gender in those value-
systems present in families, communities, firms and states (Truong, 1999). 
Furthermore, in order to ensure policy success, security agreements had been 
made between allies, which involved the sexualization of women’s identities 
and covert organization of commercial sex to care for the needs of employees 
of the security apparatus (Truong, 1990; Moon, 1997). Such social experiences 
confirm the more general historical continuity of masculinity. As Rai (2002) 
has clearly demonstrated, emasculated norms of nationalist responses have 
been woven into anti-colonial struggles and nationalist agendas. National 
strategies of ‘development’ have mostly tended to reinforce gender inequalities 
and produce complex intersecting power structures of class, gender and ethnic 
identities that cannot be easily accommodated by the language of gender 
equality. 
Feminist scholars concerned with gender issues in global political 
economy, have revealed how neo-liberal structural reforms introduced in the 
1980s has been guided by a body of knowledge based on androcentric, middle-
class and ‘productive-age’ standpoints. This has ‘naturalised’ specific activities 
central to quotidian issues of security – found for instance in caring relations 
within the social economy (Young, 2003), and in maintaining the balance in 
ecological relations, sidelining the value of such activities in national and global 
accounting systems and excluding them from planning processes (Beneria, 
2003; Elson, 2002). Feminist analyses of contemporary processes of economic 
restructuring are giving significance to changing boundaries of institutional 
responsibilities for care provisioning and services. Activities in this crucial but 
invisible domain – the coined appellation being ‘the care economy’ – involve 
both paid and unpaid work. Being both purchasable (under a variety of 
arrangements) and/or subsidized, services in the care economy straddle public 
and private domains; contraction in one type of arrangement affects another. 
Care deficits in industrialised countries arose from a convergence of factors 
such as the increased percentage of elderly persons, rising women’s entry into 
the labour force, the withdrawal of state subsidies for caring activities and the 
introduction of the new ‘workfare’ regime by which employment rather than the 
state provides the basis for social entitlements (Razavi, 2006). The global ‘care’ 
chains – with migrant women from low-income countries as care providers – 
now cater to the ‘care deficits’ in high-income countries. Per pro migrants’ 
remittances, care for dependents in their countries of origin is sustained and 
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the burdens of any debt crises therein are eased. Gender, ethnicity and age 
influence relations of labour in global care chains as well as differential 
treatment by employers and by the state (Chang, 2000; Sassen, 2003). Spike 
Peterson (2003) shows how the rise of finance-driven decision-making 
processes along with increased fragmentation and flexibilisation of labour have 
together forged complex and transnational circuits of integration between 
productive, reproductive and virtual economies. Inequalities of race, gender, 
class, and nations have interacted in ways that structure the scaffold supporting 
the ideals of neo-liberal globalisation.  
Contributions to the study of intra- and inter-state conflicts by feminist 
scholars in conflict studies have highlighted how gender underpins a war 
system and how rape can be used as a tool to destroy the manliness of the 
‘Other’ with humanitarian implications (Farwell, 2004; Hutchings, 2000). The 
nexus between militarization and masculinity can also result in violence against 
men and boys who are deemed to be the protagonist ‘Other’. Selective 
targeting of males – based on their ethnicity, sexual orientations, religious 
affinity – for massacre, sexual abuse or forced recruitment in armed conflicts – 
is an especial issue which confronts the hegemonic understanding of gender 
violence being coincidental with violence against women (Carpenter, 2002; 
2006). Conventional security studies conducted within the binary 
understanding of gender are likely to produce non-congruent definitions of 
gender-based rights and, thus, disadvantage those who do not fit such 
established categorisations. A focus on women as individuals with rights to 
protection – though necessary in view of the depth and scale of violence facing 
them during protracted conflicts and crisis situations – is insufficient to address 
the deeper seeds and the subsequent manifestations of violence. Multiple 
processes of gendering and the re-configuration of social divisions have 
produced complex terrains of power in which systematic abuse no longer fits 
the clear-cut framework of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’.  
The discursive changes within UN organisations and governmental 
agencies to respond to these problems are based on an a-historical and a-
political understanding of gender. This understanding classifies gender under 
the rubric of women’s rights, gender mainstreaming and women’s 
empowerment, and has limited relevance to women (and men) positioned at an 
intersection of different axes of social power. The tendency to write ‘gender’ in 
the planning machinery without sufficient contextual understanding of its 
meaning can reinforce experiences of social exclusion resulting from gender 
identities which do not fit the templates of planners. Issues of participation and 
representation can acquire instrumental values and therefore can become 
socially meaningless at best, oppressive at worst (Saunders, 2002). Viewing 
‘development’ and ‘security’ from diverse feminist epistemological perspectives 
reveals the many circuits of power that connect the two domains and how their 
administrative separation at national and international levels are more virtual 
than real.  
To recapitulate, critical writing of gender into the canvas of ‘development’ 
and ‘security’ has produced in the last decades what may be considered as 
another ‘quilt’. The craft of quilting involves the handling of differences in 
texture and form; differences are not necessarily discerned on the basis of a-
priori conceptions but require a full engagement with the materials to sense, feel 
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and see how they may fit together in small patches, which then – when 
assembled – allow the broader patterns to emerge (Flannery, 2001). These 
contributions have come from diverse feminist knowledge networks, drawing 
insights from different streams of feminist epistemology and motivated by a 
common concern about the contemporary unjust word order. 
4 HUMAN SECURITY AND THE ONTOLOGY OF 
CARE  
Built on a ‘relational ontology’ care offers an alternate understanding of social 
reality. It posits that the constitution of each and every entity in the human-
scale reality is made up of a nexus of relationships, and all entities have a 
shared being and a mutual constitution. Caring for the self in this regards also 
means an openness to ‘otherness’, to that something that can neither be totally 
dominated and controlled, nor made to acquire features of the ‘self’ – 
otherwise there is no one with whom to have a relationship (Slife, 2005: 159, 
167).  
Aspects of a relational ontology on the matters of security at the 
international level are to be found in the Brandt Commission Report 
(Independent Commission on International Development, 1980). The report 
envisaged the crisis at the end of the 20th century as one in which state and 
inter-state institutions have failed to address human deprivation, the spread of 
disease, environmental stress, political repression and the arms race. The 
‘inevitability’ of a crisis required an understanding of ‘security’ which goes 
beyond the sovereign rights of a government, to include both the multiple 
referents of security – institutions, communities and persons – and the 
relationships that link them.  Achieving people-centred security (human 
security) is defined as a collective endeavour, which must recognise the 
significance of the quality of relations between nations, citizens and their part in 
the ecosystems. The report brought to the fore the multi-dimensional and 
interconnected character of vulnerability of human beings and their societies, 
albeit restricted to relations between nation-states. Re-reading the Report in the 
light of the ongoing contributions to the fields of human development, human 
rights and human security reveals a historical continuity of ideas along with 
fuller understanding of both the role of institutions and the ‘social’ as a multi-
layered entity. In a globalized world the ‘social’ transcends the boundaries of 
nation-states and demands a corresponding conception of ‘justice’.  
Work on a normative account of human development began in the late 
1980s as a joint effort between two South Asian male economists, Mahbub ul 
Haq and Amartya Sen. The American feminist philosopher Martha Nussbaum 
joined the team in the 1990s. This enterprise – sponsored by the United 
Nations Development Programme – began with a conceptual framework for 
human development, the main goal of which is to build a human-centred 
parameter for the assessment of development impacts in order to re-orient 
policy. Its concept of human development extends the meaning beyond the 
rise or fall of national incomes to include the social, political and cultural 
environments which foster (or obstruct) people’s capability to develop their 
full potential and to lead productive and creative lives in accord with what they 
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themselves value. It seeks those meanings of development that are more 
reflective of human lives (Gasper, 2004). The Human Development Annual 
Report (first launched in 1990) provides a yearly worldwide assessment of the 
major dimensions of wellbeing: health, education, employment and longevity. 
The concept of Human Security was first introduced in the 1994 Human 
Development Annual Report and became more finely tuned in the following 
years10.  Endorsement of the concept of human security galvanised efforts by 
policy makers and civic organisations to draw up and act upon specific forms 
of direct violence and insecurity, such as landmines, recruitment of child 
soldiers and trade in small arms. This endorsement also led to the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court. In 1999, a Human Security 
Network was launched composed of 12 like-minded countries11, as well as 
activists and scholars. The goal was to establish an informal and flexible 
mechanism to bring a ‘human security perspective’ to bear on political 
processes aimed both at preventing or solving conflicts and at promoting 
peace and development. Japan and Canada – in 1998 and 2000 respectively – 
took the bold step of trying to make human security the defining characteristic 
of their foreign policy. The then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, instituted 
a Commission on Human Security (co-chaired by Amartya Sen and Sadako 
Ogata) whose report released in 2003 has resulted in a permanent UN 
Advisory Board on Human Security.  
The prominence of the Human Security concept is growing in different 
regions. In the European Union there is increasing recognition that the security 
of European citizens cannot be separated from human security elsewhere in 
the world, and that contribution to global human security on the part the 
Union is exigent (Glasius, and Kaldor, 2006). The links between climate 
change, human security and violent conflicts has recently been brought to the 
fore, with a realisation that the intersections between different social 
dimensions of vulnerability – such as fragile livelihoods, poverty, weak states 
and large-scale migration to neighbouring areas – can indeed provoke violent 
conflicts (Barnett and Adger, 2007). 
The contributions of Sen (1999) and Nussbaum (1995; 2000) gave a fuller 
understanding of human development from the perspective of moral theories 
                                                 
10 The 1994 report defines the major dimensions of human security as follows : (a) 
economic security: the ability of a government to assure every individual a minimum 
requisite income; (b) food security: guaranteed physical and economic access to basic 
nutrition; (c) health security: guaranteed a minimum protection from disease; (d) 
environmental security: protection from short- and long-term ravages of nature and 
from human-made deterioration of the natural environment; (e) personal security: 
protection from physical violence – whether from external states, or internal sources 
of violence including abuse in personal relations; (f) community security: the 
protection from loss of traditional relationships and values, also from sectarian and 
ethnic violence; (g) political security: receipt of full respect for basic human rights.  
11 The network includes Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Slovenia, and Thailand. South Africa participated 
as an observer. 
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based a species-specific concept of capabilities. Nussbaum links the articles of 
the Universal Bill of Rights with 10 basic capabilities12, clearly stating her 
commitment to make the nation-state and inter-state institutions more 
accountable. Sen does not commit himself such classification and prefers to 
keep the definition of human capabilities as a process of deliberative 
democracy (Gasper, 2005; Truong, 2006). Sen’s silence on which capabilities 
matter the most is puzzling for many. Giri (2000) points out that Sen’s concept 
of human development omits an ontological striving for a deep 
conceptualisation of self and self-realisation in which the meaning of 
‘development as freedom’ needs to be accompanied by the meaning of 
‘development as responsibility’.  
A more friendly reading of Sen’s work on human security would suggest 
that he seeks a more apposite conception of the ‘social’ in which human 
subjects have ‘plural affiliations’: a conception which perhaps demands a 
corresponding conception of ‘justice’ and ‘responsibility’. The notion of ‘plural 
affiliations’ would seem to require a historical dimension to be made explicit. 
Sen (2001) distinguishes between international equity and global equity; the former 
referring to just and fair relations between nations as aggregates; the latter to 
just and fair practices by diverse institutions operating across borders (firms 
and business, social groups and political organisations, non-governmental 
organisations of different types). These institutions have to face issues of 
purpose, relevance and propriety – issues that cannot be dissociated from 
concerns of justice (and responsibility). The contributions of these institutions 
to human capabilities and freedoms need to be subject to evaluation. Sen 
(2001) seems to suggest a multi-level approach to matters of global justice. 
This will need placing the social practice of all institutions operating across 
borders in their contextual boundaries, vetting the values they hold and the 
legitimacy of their actions and outcomes. Taking this route would require more 
specificity on the matter of the level, the actors, the evaluator and standards 
appropriate to the assessment of security enhancement and human fulfilment.  
It requires an understanding on how any combination of the seven 
components of human security are intermeshed to produce a specific situation 
that threatens (or protect) the vital core of human lives.  
There is a great degree of resonance between feminist critiques of 
development, ecological thinking and the type of reasoning in the ‘Human 
Security’ discourse – notably in its shift of security concerns from the state to 
society, and the emphasis on democratisation to build a meaningful 
commitment towards planetary well-being. Concerns about the narrow 
understanding of group rights and a singular understanding of identity require 
security concerns to be more epistemologically grounded and rooted in 
particular geo-political contexts (Hudson, 2005; Hyndman, 2004). The demand 
for such ‘situated’ understanding and action does not imply a whole rejection 
of universal norms, rather, a more reflexive approach to: (a) the existing 
                                                 
12 These 10 are: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination and thought; 
emotions; practical reason; affiliation; relations with other species; play; control over 
one’s environment at the political and material levels. 
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institutions; (b) their contextual performance; and (c) their capacity to pursue 
(or dislocate) human security goals.  
In this vein, the ethics of care can strengthen a vision on human security, 
which accords significance to diversity, particularity and context (Gasper and 
Truong, 2009). Hutchings’ (2000) application of care ethics to international 
relations shows how care ethics do not blend well with the accepted value of 
‘universality of rights’ because care discourses are deeply tainted by gender 
constructs – conflating acts of caring as they do with the female identity, and 
giving the male prototype as the benchmark to validate ethical judgements. 
Informed by conception of a ‘fixed and stable subject’ rights discourses tend to 
marginalise care as stream of thought in global affairs – except in humanitarian 
intervention. Yet care ethics can help reveal how the virtual dichotomy of 
violent and non-violent means of international intervention is problematic. 
From the lens of care the gendered effects of ‘non-violent’ economic sanctions 
would appear capable of provoking more profound forms of violence since 
they undermine quotidian security and turn violence inwards without any 
external physical force. Likewise, ‘rape as a crime against humanity’ can be 
non-transformative since it is build on a given understanding of the gender of 
the offenders and victims, and is considered a crime only in the context of an 
institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial 
group over any other racial group or groups. The hegemonic meanings 
ascribed to ‘violence’, ‘non-violence’, ‘rape’ in international intervention can 
benefit from deepening understanding of the characteristics of a particular 
condition of its occurrence, and that of its judgement, which can help correct 
and/or challenges the fixed nature of moral assumptions. Care ethics in this 
regard would appeal to intuitiveness and self-reflexivity in understanding and 
judging to identify an injustice stemming from institutional rigidity which fails 
to recognise gendered power relations within a particular structure and 
decision making process (Hutchings, 2000). In other words, a justice system 
should be able to interrogate itself to arrive at careful judgements (or to 
practice care as self-reflexivity and prudence in judging to enhance its 
competence). 
Engster (2007) takes a rather different track and seeks to integrate care 
ethics with political theory. He begins with the acknowledgement that inter-
dependence is a realist view of humanity, meaning to say, care giving and care 
receiving have evolved as universal and permanent features of human society. 
Engster echoes Hutchings in demonstrating how Western political theories are 
deeply gendered and therefore create a dichotomy between ‘particularistic’ care 
and ‘universal’ justice. He offers a notion of care that is aligned with natural 
law theory where he demonstrates that the responsibility to give care facilitates 
the most basic goals in life (survival, development and basic functioning). 
Bringing care back into the realm of moral reasoning is imperative because its 
erosion has the potential to generate chaos and anarchy. Engster offers a 
‘rational theory of obligation’ within his theory of care, defined as one which 
goes beyond the dominant practice of provision for one’s immediate group. It 
seeks to produce collective caring arrangements that address the needs of a 
society. This obligation is grounded neither on sympathy nor compassion but 
on the fact of interdependence. Care theory in Ensgter’s view can serve as a 
minimal capabilities theory because it does place emphasis on human needs – 
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and to some extent tallies with the theory of justice advanced by Nussbaum – 
although he resists her listing of capabilities as being too closely linked with the 
Western model of democracy and calls for greater flexibility to account for 
cultural diversity. Generally, care theory calls for public support to sustain a 
flexible and decentralised approach to caring activities, which maximises the 
particularity of context and allows the space for individuals to determine how 
they may arrange care in ways that can protect their ‘autonomy’.  
Baker et al (2004) treat dependency and autonomy as different moments 
in the human life cycle rather than binary opposites, and offer a model of an 
egalitarian society. In their view an egalitarian society must pay attention to: (a) 
equality in economic relations and access to resources; (b) equality in the social 
and cultural domains: systems of communication, interpretation and 
representation (media, education, the churches) ensuring equality of respect 
and recognition of differences; (c) equality of power in both public and private 
institutions (formal politics, governing boards, work committees, 
family/personal relations); and (d) equality in affective relationships (being able 
to receive and provide on equal terms love, care, and solidarity which operate 
at different sites – personal relationships, work relations, community and 
associational relations).  Affective equality integrates concepts of autonomy 
and interdependency with our understanding of equality and ‘citizenship’; it 
recognises the citizen as an economic, social, cultural and political actor as well 
as a universal caregiver and care recipient.   
These contributions show the acknowledgement of a ‘relational ontology’ 
present both in the writing on human security and care, although the degree of 
depth of being ‘relational’ may differ. In the human security discourses the 
notion of ‘relational’ tends to be restricted to the links between pre-defined 
separate entities and does not necessarily address how each and every entity 
can be a mutual constitution through interaction with one another. Feminist 
discussions on care gravitate towards a deeper level of being relational, 
inclusive of but beyond institutions, to address also the process ‘subjectivation’ 
– or the making of the social subject as a relational subject through thoughtful 
interaction and mutual transformation.  
5 CONCLUSION 
By deepening the dimension of the social in epistemology from a gender 
perspective, feminist scholars have provided an opportunity to reflect on the 
role of care in real lives and in epistemic interactions, and how the values of 
care (attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness) can help 
create new pathways to understand the social world. Care, when free from the 
constraints of gender as a binary construct, can show its wider relevance for 
social transformation built on an affinity among humans, between them and 
other life forms. Analogous to water, care has neither shape nor colour, 
adopting as it does the particular shape of the object that contains it. A subject 
may express the sense of care in the particular context in which she/he is 
situated through institutionally recognized forms. Beyond this aspect care has a 
larger meaning: the recognition of mutual constitution – or how the ‘self’ is to 
be found in ‘others’ and the ‘others’ in ‘self’. Care in this meaning can help 
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direct human intention and action towards self-reflexivity to promote the 
benign rather than predatory side of being human for a cognitive alliance in 
support of an eco-minded and human-centred security to be possible.  
Institutional rigidity that fails to fully honour affinity among humans and 
between them and other life forms and to accept the changes required to 
achieve a more secure and sustainable future can benefit from Rolin’s ideas of 
contextual epistemic justification. By calling into question the credibility of 
formerly accepted assumptions on harms and benefits and placing these 
justifications on a given scale of social and ecological disharmony, contextual 
justification can be extended beyond the epistemic privilege accorded to a 
given subject position humans occupy but also to its relationships with other 
life forms. Haraway’s notion of diffraction and Spivak’s concept of hyper self-
reflexivity – though articulated from different standpoints – may be 
understood as the recognition of different types and moments of ‘awakening’ 
through an open attitude in epistemic interaction and the recognition of other 
possibilities of knowing. Code’s notion of responsible knowledge and co-
habitability underlines careful treatment of the relations between different 
knowledge systems and values co-operation and co-learning. These are 
important to direct the schooling of the knowledge agents towards relationality 
and epistemic humility in order to learn and become holistic.  
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